FEMA’s New Think Tank — not the way to go [Corrected]

FEMA has just released details of a new endeavor.  The good news is that FEMA thinks it needs a Think Tank, and the Deputy Director has set one up online.  It relies in part on Twitter, which in my view is useless for most serious conversations though it might be useful for emergency alerts. In my view,   this type of online exchange is not a Think Tank; I  would have called it a forum or an information exchange. In depth thinking needs to be orchestrated differently .

Why am I so negative on this topic? In recent weeks I have been editing some very thoughtful work by noted academics in the field of EM in the U.S., and the number of complicated and intractable problems that FEMA faces is considerable.  The new Think Tank is not likely to get to the fundamental issues, conflicts, and problems.  I am waiting for FEMA to make a try to solve or minimize some of them. I will be glad to provide a list of fundamental issues we have identified.

Federal Funding for Disasters

This topic is damn serious, folks. Three takes on the problem:

Washington Post article titled: How will FEMA pay for Hurricane Irene?

With less than $1 billion currently available for federal disaster assistance, the Federal Emergency Management Agency is temporarily suspending payments to rebuild roads, schools and other structures destroyed during spring tornadoes in Joplin, Mo. and southern states in order to pay for damage caused by Hurricane Irene.

FEMA is placing restrictions on paying for longer-term repair, rebuilding and mitigation projects from previous natural disasters in order to ensure the solvency of the federal disaster relief fund, which pays for emergency management costs and public rebuilding projects, the agency said. The decision will impact the spring tornadoes and disasters dating back several years.

The move “prioritizes the immediate, urgent needs of survivors and states when preparing for or responding to a disaster,” said FEMA spokeswoman Rachel Racusen.

The White House is expected to declare similar disasters in other states as soon as today, further sapping money from the relief fund, which currently has about $900 million, below the $1 billion officials prefer to keep on hand.

The shortfall means the Obama administration will soon request supplemental funding from Congress, likely causing another fight over federal spending as a new “supercommittee” prepares to identify trillions of dollars in government spending cuts.
Already House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.) has said that any new money for FEMA will be offset by spending cuts elsewhere.

This issue is not new.  About two weeks ago I posted an article about the need to find an alternative means of funding disasters, other than via supplemental appropriations. See my posting on August 10  re the need for an alternative.  Once again that topic comes to the fore, now that Hurricane Irene is tearing up the east coast.  See this article titled Disaster Budget Becomes Political Issue, Aug. 28.

As Hurricane Irene slams into the East Coast, the federal disaster relief agency is dangerously low on cash. And politicians are already bickering about where to get new money.  It’s been a busy year for America’s disaster agency, and that may soon spell disaster for its budget.

So far in 2011, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has responded to  “major disasters” 65 times, among the highest in the agency’s history. The unprecedented demand has stretched the agency and its budget increasingly thin.  Craig Fugate, FEMA’s administrator, told White House reporters in May that the agency’s disaster relief fund was running low, then just above $1 billion. Without an infusion from Congress, he said, relief workers would only address immediate needs, like delivering food and water, instead of less immediate concerns like clearing felled trees and cleaning streets.

But just weeks before the worst of Hurricane Irene began to pelt Washington, D.C. and New York with heavy rain and wind, the agency’s disaster relief fund dropped below $1billion—to $792 million—nearly the lowest the fund has ever been only eight months into the year. As a result, FEMA officials on Saturday implemented what’s known as “immediate needs funding guidance,” which allows the agency to divert funds from long-term repair and rebuilding projects so it can focus on response and recovery efforts from the hurricane.

FEMA spokesperson … said that the agency had the funds to meet the immediate needs of disaster survivors. But, she said, “This strategy prioritizes the immediate, urgent needs of survivors and states when preparing for or responding to a disaster.”

From Forbes magazine on August 30th, this article.

Some Praise for FEMA

Washington, DC, June 16, 2009 -- DHS Secretary...

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I am always glad to note some positive comments about FEMA, when they happen.  “A Season of Wild Wind and Water,” in Homeland Security Today, Aug. 15.

Amid an unprecedented onslaught of storms and tornadoes, FEMA just may be achieving mission success.  In this season of extensive and devastating disasters, Director Craig Fugate, head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), just may have led his agency to again find its “groove”—effectively aiding disaster response and recovery.

Federal, state and local officials from at least a dozen states across the central and southern parts of the country, mostly along the Mississippi River and its tributaries, have worked at full capacity through the spring and early summer to respond to what seems like endless disaster: billions of dollars worth of homes, businesses and public buildings lost, not to mention the deaths of some 527 people as of June 8.

From the summary analysis of the article:

It wasn’t that long ago—five years in fact—that FEMA was the much-maligned actor in the Katrina aftermath, blamed for everything from the personal incompetence of top officials to decisionmaking slowness and logistical disorganization. Knowledgeable observers say that an infusion of confidence and resources from the Obama administration, combined with Fugate’s sage guidance, prepared the agency for an impressive response to the outbreak of devastating storms and flooding this spring.

FEMA gets high marks from disaster experts for inserting field staff into the disaster zones quickly and opening up communication with local and state officials. So many of these tornadoes hit in succession and in multiple states within hours—creating millions, if not billions, of dollars in property destruction upon impact—that FEMA was uniquely challenged with getting resources and people on the ground fast and dealing with different governors and county officials, all with different needs. At the same time, it prepared for and reacted to ongoing flood conditions across at least nine states.

This is not to say that FEMA is “there yet,” said experts. It still lacks the resources and focus to prepare for a more catastrophic event. With ongoing economic fragility and more attention paid to the national debt and fiscal restraint on Capitol Hill, however, it is not clear that the agency will necessarily get its wishlist in terms of additional funding. It may just have to make do with what it has.

But Fugate’s leadership has improved morale and encouraged a proactive culture, so maybe getting its “groove back” is good enough for FEMA right now.

Response to Tornadoes is a Test of FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

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Response to Tornadoes a Test of FEMA WashPost, April 29, 2011.  In addition to describing the visit of President Obama and FEMA Dir. Craig Fugate, the article goes on to note:

FEMA’s image is still suffering in the south following its botched response to Hurricane Katrina and other deadly storms in 2005. Fugate stressed that his agency “is in a support role” and taking cues from state leaders.

Federal assistance would be “for recovery activities,” Fugate said. “That would come from the governor through our regional offices and then to the president.”

The storms come as the federal government is monitoring the first-ever major earthquake drill across 11 midwestern states, including storm-ravaged Alabama and Tennessee. Fugate said the drill will continue as scheduled.

“We do have to be prepared for concurrent natural disasters occurring in this country, earthquakes being one of them,” he said, noting that FEMA is also providing assistance to wildfire relief efforts in Florida, New Mexico and Texas and dealing with the aftermath of severe flooding in other states.

Four New Issuances of Interest this Week- update

  • Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)#8 the full text document (6 pp.)  was issued on April 8th; click here to access it. So far (April 9) the only discussion of the meaning and implications of this document is taking place on the Homeland Security Watch blog; the blog posts there are generating some interesting commentary.
  • FEMA Strategic Plan for 2011-2014 and FEMA’s Capstone Doctrine (dated Nov. 2010) are available here.

U.S. Readiness for a Catastrophic Event — not too certain

Federal Emergency Management Agency

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I listened to part of the Senate hearing yesterday, details and testimony can be found here. It was not exactly reassuring to hear the recently retired Inspector General of DHS enumerate the problems and issues known for years and complain about the slow pace of change and remediation.  More details about the hearing were provided by GovExec.com, March 18th, in their article titled: Senators question U.S. preparedness in wake of Japan’s crisis.

Members of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on Thursday questioned which federal agency and individual within the federal government would take the lead in responding to a catastrophe like the one gripping Japan.

“Is it really clear who’s responsible for what if, God forbid, we had the kind of multiple catastrophes that Japan is experiencing right now?” the committee’s ranking member, Susan Collins, R-Maine, asked the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, at a hearing.

There was no clear answer, as FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate said that the response would depend on several factors, such as where the disaster occurred and whether local first responders survived. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would lead efforts after a disaster at a nuclear-power plant, Fugate said. FEMA, on the other hand, would be responsible for coordinating evacuations around the plant.

Overall, Fugate said, FEMA has made “significant progress” in preparing to deal with a catastrophe, but “we have much work to be done.”

But FEMA does not yet have an adequate system to assess what kind of capabilities exist in states and cities across the country to handle disasters, said William Jenkins, the Government Accountability Office’s director of homeland-security and justice issues.

I realize only a week has gone by since the start of the disasters in Japan, but it would be nice to see some signs of concern and action from Congress and FEMA about dealing with a catastrophic disaster. Yesterday was not one.

FEMA Is Not Learning From History — what a surprise!

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I have to admit it is fun saying ” I told you so.”  When I say it, no one pays much attention; but now that FEMA’s Inspector General has addressed the problem maybe people will think about it. The new report, issued today,  is titled Lack of After-Action Reviews Hurts FEMA Knowledge Base. The specifics of the report are OIG-11-32, dated January 2011.

As noted in the publication HSToday, FEMA has not been conducting after-action reviews for all disasters, contrary to the agency’s policy,.

In addition, FEMA has been unable to distribute previously gathered information on lessons learned and best practices due to technology failures and limitations, discovered the IG report, FEMA’s Progress in Implementing the Remedial Action Management Program.”

“FEMA stood up its Remedial Action Management Program in July 2003 to identify lessons learned and best practices for dealing with disaster response and recovery operations. The program aims to identify problems and limitations encountered by FEMA in response to a natural disaster or terrorist incident and record information on overcoming those challenges in a database for FEMA personnel to explore. However, FEMA personnel have not consistently produced this information after every disaster, as required by the policies of the RAMP. As such, FEMA personnel have lost opportunities to share knowledge with their colleagues….” “Failing to conduct after-action reviews limits the lessons learned and best practices generated by the agency, preventing FEMA personnel from learning from the experiences of their colleagues” As a result, the vast majority of FEMA personnel cannot access historical data on lessons learned and best practices.” [Their emphasis.]

In my opinion the investigation did not go far enough. Although the RAMP program is important, I suggest there are many broader concerns about failure to read and learn from historic disasters. The lack of information about major and catastrophic disaster events that have happened in past decades is a glaring omission, in my view. From 30+ years of experience, I would note that some of the tasks that FEMA has failed to do for many years are: prepare candid and actionable after-action reports, conduct independent field investigations after a major disaster, and document case studies.  Additionally, efforts to store, analyze, synthesize, and then share findings have been inadequate. Regarding the recovery phase, for example, neither a body of theory nor a knowledge base exists presently. FEMA is more than 30 years old. It is time to deal with these matters.

For many years, I have been working on various charts, reports, and books that deal with the need to know the history of emergency management and to learn from it. I expect to have more to say on this topic later.  Your comments are invited.

Wondering about the final National Disaster Recovery Framework? Me too!

Several of us have been wondering if DHS will ever issue the long-overdue final National Disaster Recovery Framework, as required by the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. A draft version was issued in February 2010, available on the DHS Website, but I have seen no mention of when the final version will be issued or what the it will contain.

Well, it seems the most information available publicly presently is in a presentation on the National Disaster Recovery Framework, given by Elizabeth Zimmerman of DHS at the International Recovery Forum, in Japan, January 12, 2011.  From the conference site, her 13 slides are available, but a few new concepts — such as the Whole of Community Approach to Catastrophic Planning — need further explanation, in my view.

I find it ironic, to say the least, that the international community has more information about the Framework than the domestic community does.

Assessment Report on FEMA’s Emergency Support Function Roles and Responsibilities

A newly released report from the Office of the Inspector General at DHS, reviews all of the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs).  While generally positive, ESF #14 did come in for some criticism. In my view the OIG did not dig deeply enough; I think the recovery process is fraught with deficiencies. From the report summary:

FEMA generally has fulfilled its Emergency Support Function roles and responsibilities. Specifically, the agency manages mission assignments, executes contracts, and procures goods and services for its Emergency Support Function activities. However, the agency can improve its coordination with stakeholders and its operational readiness.

FEMA should be coordinating with stakeholders for all Emergency Support Functions. For example, there was little evidence that support agencies are regularly included in planning meetings for an Emergency Support Function mission, even though agency officials said that such coordination would be beneficial. The agency must coordinate these activities with all relevant federal departments and agencies, state and local officials, and private sector entities to effectively execute the Emergency Support Function mission.

FEMA also should be fully prepared to provide community assistance after a disaster. Specifically, it is not conducting long-term recovery exercises, and one Emergency Support Function does not have clearly defined procedures to identify and deploy needed recovery services to disaster affected communities.

The report contains 11 recommendations that, when implemented, should improve FEMA’s efforts to meet its Emergency Support Function roles and responsibilities.

On Dec. 10, CQ Homeland Security commented on some of the content; their comments on the recovery aspect are as follows:

“FEMA also should be fully prepared to provide community assistance after a disaster,” it said.

For example, the report found that for post-disaster funding, FEMA has 36 full-time public assistance grant program employees, with 1,200 disaster assistance employees ready to supplement them in an emergency. However, the inspector general noted that as of February, 43 percent of the emergency staff were deployed to previous disasters, 15 percent were available and 42 percent were listed as “unavailable.” FEMA has said those numbers are inaccurate, though, as about 50 percent of the reserve staff typically make themselves available when an emergency hits.

And, while the report noted that FEMA already holds many hearings with its partners in response, the inspector general found that a few communications gaps still exist. For example, when it comes to communications restoration, “FEMA needs to consistently hold meetings with stakeholders and complete required reports from the regions to ensure continued coordination with stakeholders and to assess emergency communications capabilities and needs,” the report said.

This additional information does not make me any more optimistic about recovery. In my opinion ESF #14 is not well-conceived, so I do not find details about implementation satisfying. Recovery is far more comprehensive and complex than ESF 14 suggests.  Additionally, the final version of the National Disaster Recovery Framework still has not been issued.

Legal Conflicts re BP Oil Spill Disaster Plans and Response

Lawmakers Question Coordination of Federal, Local Responses to Emergencies
by Rob Margetta, CQ Today, September 22, 2010 [Subscription service.]

Two of the major issues that emerged in a recent House hearing on the SP Spill are ( 1) conflicts between state and federal laws, and (2) which federal dept. should have the lead for disaster planning and response.

After hearing descriptions of a disconnect between Louisiana officials and the Coast Guard during the response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, members of the House Homeland Security Committee said they may have to re-examine the laws that connect the state to the federal government during emergencies. Craig Paul Taffaro Jr., president of St. Bernard Parish in Louisiana, told the committee that his state has different authorizing legislation for response efforts than other Gulf Coast states.
“Louisiana law specifically grants emergency powers to local authorities . . . during times of declared disasters,” he said. “This construct seemed to create a bureaucratic obstacle that has plagued the coordination of the response effort throughout.”

The problem, Taffaro said, is that the Clean Air Act (PL 101-549) and other federal statutes governing emergency response do not recognize or mesh well with the Louisiana system. Local authority was met with “resistance, exclusion and power struggles” after the spill, he said.

The Homeland Security Department (DHS) was expected to take a leadership role after the spill, Thompson said. “Yet, as we all now know, the department did not have a role in reviewing or assessing the plans for the response and recovery of this type of disaster,” he added. Instead, the agency in charge of regulating offshore platforms — then known as the Minerals Management Service, a bureau within the Interior Department — was responsible for the plan. Coast Guard officials testified that their agency had no role in overseeing the Deepwater Horizon emergency procedures.

With regard to which federal agency/department should have the lead role,

Sheila Jackson Lee, chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, said DHS needs to be at the center of all response planning, adding that DHS would have been more appropriate than Interior in the case of Deepwater Horizon. “The backbone of response has to be Homeland Security,” the Texas Democrat said.

The situation reflects other regulatory issues that affect DHS, Thompson said, including the fact that the Federal Emergency Management Agency plays a role in reviewing the nuclear power plant emergency response plans required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. FEMA is unclear on whether it should be working with the NRC, plant owners or local authoritiesThe Homeland Security Department (DHS) was expected to take a leadership role after the spill, Thompson said. “Yet, as we all now know, the department did not have a role in reviewing or assessing the plans for the response and recovery of this type of disaster,” he added.

Instead, the agency in charge of regulating offshore platforms — then known as the Minerals Management Service, a bureau within the Interior Department — was responsible for the plan. Coast Guard officials testified that their agency had no role in overseeing the Deepwater Horizon emergency procedures.