New CRS Report on the Disaster Relief Fund

New report from the Congressional Research Service is titled Disaster Relief Fund; Overview and Selected Issues. May 2014.

This report not only provides basic information about federal payment for disasters but also makes some proposals for better management of the disaster declaration process (see pp. 15-23). A good basic document to add to your personal library.

Thanks to Bill Cumming for the citation.

Aftermath of Deepwater Horizon Spill- health aspects

The Gulf Study Four Years after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill:

The National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) Gulf Long-term Follow-up Study (GuLF) is a long term health study with over 100,000 participants composed of oil spill cleanup workers and volunteers who responded to the April 2010 explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico. The NIEHS held a teleconference on April 11th to update members of the media, the public and study participants on the progress of the study. This post provides a summary of the call, including a review of progress made and preliminary observations. Go to: http://www.niehs.nih.gov/news/newsletter/2014/5/spotlight-gulf/index.htm

____________________________________

UPDATE: See the comment section for an additional recommended source of information.

__________________________________

One more source of information about the general recovery from the major spill incident is this recent CRS report.

Great Report: “Let’s Stop Improvising Disaster Recovery”

I had mentioned this report at the tail end of the previous posting, but I think it is noteworthy and I do not want readers to miss it. It is not a new report, published in 2013, but I just discovered thanks to the author providing comments to my last posting. Here is the link for  James Fossett’s article titled “Let’s Stop Improvising Disaster Recovery.”

 

Posted in Uncategorized | 1 Reply

Lament re Disaster Recovery Housing Programs

The Diva wants to share this personal assessment she received recently re the severe problems encountered with federal housing programs after a disaster. It is written by a trusted person with practical knowledge of the recovery process, including recent experience after Hurricane Sandy. For obvious reasons, the author does not want to be identified.

I appreciate the author’s candor and value these observations because they help to explain the problems behind the scenes. In the past year I have posted dozens of articles about the problems and slow progress with housing recovery post-Sandy. Now I have a better understanding of the reasons. Some key points from the email:

Having lived for 15+ years with the fragmented, uncoordinated array of programs that are the federal de-facto policy for major disaster home repair, I think to may be time to begin thinking of a better way.

Owners of disaster damaged homes now get their repair assistance from a variety of sources such as:

  • 1. FEMA-funded Shelter and Temporary Essential Power (STEP) pilot program direct essential repair services
  • 2. National Flood Insurance Program settlements for
    a. Repair/reconstruction and
    b. Increased cost of compliance with flood-safe zoning
  • 3. FEMA Individual and Households Program (IHP) repair or replacement grants (up to about $31,000)
  • 4. State supplements to IHP – sometimes statutory (CA) usually ad hoc, per disaster.
  • 5. Small Business Administration Disaster Household Repair loans including
    a. Up to $200,000 for repair or reconstruction
    b. Up to $20,000 additional for mitigation
    c. Up to $200,000 additional to recast previous debt.
  • 6. FEMA-Sate Hazard Mitigation Grant program when targeted to home repair or acquisition
  • 7. HUD Community Development Block Grants – DR – usually a result of Congressional supplementary funding, through programs devised by state or local grantee governments.
  • 8. FEMA Funded Disaster Case management services to help household navigate and manage these and non-governmental solutions.

I dream of ONE all-encompassing federal disaster home repair program to take the place of the disconnected array of processes we now force people to struggle and suffer through.

I wonder if a single system might not deliver more complete, timely, customer-friendly and dramatically less costly home recovery after disaster.

The most politically and popularly appealing thought might be the elimination of the national flood insurance program to be replaced with a much more elegant system of risk management/financing and repair assistance.

One single, integrated program could incentivize mitigation, speed repair, increase loaning where appropriate (thereby decreasing grants), and consolidate multiple, unwieldy, constituency-maddening, uncoordinated, multi-governmental administration into a single application and fulfillment process with a named applicant assistant responsible for every complex application.

How crazy is this? Crazier than the great governments of NY, NJ, and NYC, all having had $100s of millions for home repair approved for over a year, but still unable to deliver virtually $ to applicants waiting since last Fall? Almost 20,000 applicants are waiting in NYC.

We saw this in Louisiana and assumed it was a capacity problem. In Texas, politics was assumed to be the cause of failure. But all three of these Sandy high-capacity governments can’t be the problem. It’s got to be the system of asking state/local governments to devise (for their first time) a disaster home repair program off a blank sheet of paper beginning months after the disaster happens. It’s too difficult.

Finally, the author asked me what I thought and if I knew of anyone else who is thinking this way?

I am not qualified to offer comments or suggestions, and I do not know of anyone engaged in research in this area. I invite comments and welcome information from anyone who has tackled this topic.

______________________________________________

UPDATE: Please see the comment by James Fossett that follows this posting. The link to his article is well worth highlighting. See his article titled Let’s Stop Improvising Disaster Recovery.

 

 

Loss of EM Research Institutes

As someone who has been a researcher, educator, and consultant in the emergency management field, the Diva is especially pained to hear of closing of  EM education and training organizations in first world countries. I find it truly tragic that short-sighted budget concerns will affect the emergency management community at a time when global climate and weather threats, to name just a few, are  growing larger and more serious. I truly rue the loss of knowledge acquisition and the improvement of practice in the EM field.

The latest training institute to be cut is in Australia.  See Federal Budget 2014: Mount Macedon’s Australian Emergency Management Institute to close. Last year Canada closed its EM training organization.

Here in the U.S. we saw some budget tightening moves in 2013 at the Emergency Management Institute, which is the training academy for FEMA and DHS,  Last year EMI cancelled a long-standing annual conference for the Higher Education in Emergency Management community. Fortunately, the conference will take place this year and the institution appears to be continuing with no threat of closure.

__________________

Thanks to Franklin MacDonald for the Australian citation.

 

New GAO Report on Disaster Resilience

DISASTER RESILIENCE; Actions Are Underway, but Federal Fiscal Exposure Highlights the Need for Continued Attention to Longstanding Challenges; GAO-14-603T, May 14. Both a summary and full version of this 20 page are available for download.

This report is a very interesting summation of many years of GAO studies.  Be sure to read Why GAO Did This Study, which is in the Highlights section on page one of the full report.

See also this insurance industry article for more details.