Paying for Disaster Relief and Recovery

Paying Sandy’s Big Bill;Wash Post editorial, Jan 16, 2013.  Some excerpts:

… Americans should be shocked that lawmakers still haven’t reformed the slapdash way Congress deals with disasters. The claim that those future big storms have on federal funds is potentially massive — $10 to $25 billion in a normal year and $80 to $170 billion in a bad one …. Though costs are hard to predict, Congress should at least budget disaster-assistance money upfront to the greatest extent possible and through the normal appropriations process, where the spending trade-offs are clearer and lawmakers don’t have to legislate under the duress of emergency.

Increasingly, too, Congress has been investing in infrastructure upgrades as part of disaster relief, under the compelling logic that spending some money to prepare now will head off much higher costs later. Lawmakers have considered doing the same in the Sandy recovery effort. That worthy goal, though, deserves the rational structure of a long-term plan that assesses how much the country can afford to protect and determines where to invest, instead of being tacked here and there to disaster-relief bills. Among other things, a coherent strategy would discourage Americans from building in vulnerable areas the government is unlikely to protect.

Hazards Observer newsletter- Jan. 2013

University of Colorado at Boulder viewed Red R...

I have been a fan of the Hazards Observer (H.O.), the bi-monthly publication of the Hazards Center at the University of CO/Boulder,  for many years.  And I am proud to note the previous issue (Nov./Dec. 2012) included my invited comment on “What Keeps Me Up at Night.”

The current issue (Jan. 2013) has an unusually fine collection of articles and comments regarding mitigation, recovery, and Hurricane Sandy. I highly recommend it. In particular the articles by Gavin Smith and Joe Scanlon are well worth reading.

The H.O. is available at no cost for the electronic version, and for a modest cost if you want the hardcopy version. Details are in the issues noted above.

Report on Improving Infrastructure in NY State

As noted in an earlier posting, Gov. Cuomo of NY set up 3 special commissions to provide advice and direction regarding mitigation and recovery efforts after Hurricane Sandy.  The result of one of those commission’s is described here: Preliminary Report on Improving the Strength and Resilience of New York State’s Infrastructure. Both an abstract and a link to the full report are provided,

Mitigation Measures for Buildings

The “new normal” in New York City includes consideration of mitigation measures for new construction and retrofitting existing ones, when possible. See The Generator Is the Machine of the Moment, NYTimes, Jan. 12. Some excerpts:

Now, more than two months after the storm caused millions of dollars in damage, novel and costly waterproofing techniques are being employed, including the addition of backup generators and floodgates, and the relocation of mechanical equipment. The  owners of buildings that predate the flooding are also looking at these measures, although retroactive installation is so complex and costly that some may decide not to do anything.

“This is the new normal,” said Adam Gordon, the president of Adam Gordon Holdings, which is building a condominium at 560 West 24th Street in Chelsea. “With two hurricanes in two years, this is the new base level for the way people should think about building in New York.”

Thanks to Bill Cumming for calling this article to my attention.

More re Climate Change

The economics of likely changes and questions about emergency management for future events have been discussed in several recent articles:

Economist Joseph Stiglitz recently announced that he believes climate change is the most important issue facing the U.S. economy today. Certainly, climate change is serious global issue, but how exactly will it affect the U.S. economy? What follows are some statistics on climate change’s impact on the U.S. economy, gathered primarily from non-governmental organizations that deal with climate-change issues.

Who should pay the costs of climate disasters?  In light of the current debate in the United States about federal assistance to Hurricane Sandy victims and the recent debate at the recent Doha Climate Conference about international assistance for climate change victims, that has become an increasingly pressing question for
humankind.

The frequency and cost of natural disasters is rapidly increasing. Since the 1980s the number of billion-dollar natural disasters in the United States has tripled from two to six.  In 2011 there were 14 separate $1 billion-plus weather events and losses topped $60 billion.  This year Hurricane Sandy alone will exceed that total.

Congress – use, disuse, and misuse of information and knowledge

I often write about the problems of a lack of knowledge base re emergency management in the executive branch, and FEMA is usually the primary focus. I found this article fascinating because I do not know much about members of Congress gather and use information.  Rather frightening actually, especially in view of the crucial post-Sandy recovery decisions slated for discussion later this month.

See: Congress’ Wicked Problem; Seeking Knowledge inside the Information Tsunami.New America Foundation, Dec. 2012. Author is Lorelei Kelly. The full paper is 28 pages, which I recommend to those of you serious about this topic.

The lack of shared expert knowledge capacity in the U.S. Congress has created a critical weakness in our democratic process.Along with bipartisan cooperation, many contemporary and urgent questions before our legislators require nuance, genuine deliberation and expert judgment. Congress, however, is missing adequate means for this purpose and depends on outdated and in some cases antiquated systems of information referral, sorting, communicating, and convening.

Congress is held in record low esteem by the public today. Its failings have been widely analyzed and a multitude of root causes have been identified.  This paper does not put forward a simple recipe to fix these ailments, but argues that the absence of basic knowledge management in our legislature is a critical weakness. Congress struggles to make policy on complex issues while it equally lacks the wherewithal to effectively compete on substance in today’s 24 hour news cycle. This paper points out that Congress is not so much venal and corrupt as it is incapacitated and obsolete. And, in its present state, it cannot serve the needs of American democracy in the 21st Century.

It was not always such: less than 20 years ago, Congress operated one of the world’s premier scientific advisory bodies.  It maintained an extensive network of shared expert staff–individuals and entities that comprised deep pools of both subject matter and legislative process expertise.  Importantly, most of these human resources worked for Congress as a whole and provided symmetrical access and assistance to staff and Members tasked with complex policy decision-making.  Before 1995, committee staffs were also larger and more often shared.  Joint hearings between committees and between the House and Senate were more common as well. While this former system stands in stark contrast to the one that exists today, it also offers encouragement that we can rebuild an expert knowledge system for Congress–one with even greater capabilities– by harnessing the technology tools now at hand.

This paper distinguishes between information and knowledge:  Members of Congress and their staff do not lack access to information. Yet information backed by financial interests and high-decibel advocacy is disproportionately represented. Most importantly, they lack the institutional wisdom that can be built via a deliberate system that feeds broadly inclusive information through defined processes of review, context, comparison and evaluation of the implications for the nation as a whole.  Concurrently, Congress also needs more expert judgment available to it during the policymaking process, which, for the purposes of this paper, means a focus on development of knowledge.

Specifically, knowledge asymmetry within Congress creates an uneven playing field and obstructs forward movement on policy.   In the context of this paper, knowledge asymmetry refers to the uneven distribution of trusted quality expertise inside the institution, which hinders the ability of policymakers to see aligned interests and distorts the policy process.  A good example of this is the disparity between subject matter information provided to committees versus personal staff in DC and back home in the state or district. Committees on Capitol Hill receive the lion’s share of expertise.

Two vital legislative processes deserve attention as well.  Authorization and appropriations cycles form the bedrock of Congress’ workplan. A distorting knowledge asymmetry today is the imbalance between them.  Authorization  hearings, for example, are where members engage in discussion, bring ideas to the table and deliberate on policy substance.  Ideally, they examine assumptions, make tradeoffs, set parameters, review subject matter and set policy. Appropriations is the process where members allocate money.  Authorization, in general, has atrophied considerably over the past decades, with far more institutional and outside bandwidth devoted to appropriations.

Fundamentally, this paper looks at asymmetry in two subsets: expert knowledge provision and expert knowledge sharing.

This is not a call to eliminate lobbying.  Petitioning your government is, after all, part of the Constitution. As retired Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN) points out, lobbying is part of the normal deliberative process.  He notes that Members of Congress have a responsibility to listen to lobbyists and that they are an important component of the public discussion.   “Our challenge” he says  “is not to shut it down but to make sure it’s a balanced dialogue.”

Ultimately, the political and partisan character of information in our contemporary Congress is not balanced, especially within the ongoing process of policymaking. This current condition contrasts with the broader vision and inclusive capacity of Congress from previous decades, a capacity that provided credible knowledge and bridge building to support the compromises necessary for most policymaking. The issues raised in this paper must be addressed for the policymaking process to get back on track.

Funding the Response and Recovery from H. Sandy – two mechanisms

Recent postings have focused on the pending Congressional actions for supplemental funding for relief and recovery from H. Sandy.  The prospect looms for a major debate/battle in the Congress.  Hopefully, some discussion of future threats, risks, vulnerabilities will occur and it will not just be another example of the political warfare that Congress has been displaying of late.

There is a second component of the funding that has not been getting much attention – the role and function of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). I am no expert on the details of that program, but a recent NY Times article caught my attention: Flood Insurance, Already Fragile, Faces New Stress, NY Times, Nov. 12, 2012.  One brief excerpt:

The federal government’s flood insurance program, which fell $18 billion into debt after Hurricane Katrina, is once again at risk of running out of money as the daunting reconstruction from Hurricane Sandy gets under way. de it clear to me just how important and how dysfunctional the program is currently.

Since the problems and issues are numerous and complex, please read the full article to understand how important this funding source is and could be.

Thanks to Tom Antush for calling this article to my attention.

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New Risk Report from the UK

A new, very worthwhile, report  on Risk Assessment from the Government Office of Science (UK) Jan. 5th: Reducing Risks of Future Disasters: Priorities for Decision Makers. From the foreword:

“Science tells us why disasters happen and where many of the risks lie, and for some disasters we can even forecast when they will occur. The aim of this Report has therefore been to review the latest science and evidence, and to take stock of the further improvements that lie ahead. In so doing, it sets out priorities and options for how DRR [disaster risk reduction] can be substantially improved today and into the future.

The key message is that disaster and death are not the inevitable consequence of greater exposure to hazards. It is possible to stabilise disaster impacts, save lives and protect livelihoods. However, achieving this will require a change in culture and a new approach. Everyone with a stake in developing countries needs to play their part in reducing risk. For example, this Report argues that policy makers far beyond the traditional boundaries of development and disaster response need to recognise that they also have a key part to play in DRR, as does the private sector.”

Some past postings on this blog also deal with risk assessment. To find them  use the search function at bottom right of homepage to locate them. For example, see these risk communications docs from Univ. of MD.

And it would be great if there were a U.S. version of this report!