Category Archives: Federal Response

Gas Pipeline Safety — another neglected hazard comes to the forefront

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Another example of 20/20 hindsight. The pipeline safety issue has a lot in common with the deep sea oil drilling matter: regulations dominated by industry for their benefit.  ProPublica just published Fatal Pipeline Accident Turns Attention to Nation’s Aging Pipelines

…the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [in the Dept. of Transportation], the federal agency that regulates 2.3 million miles of oil and natural gas pipelines, largely relies on standards written by the oil and gas industry. It has about 100 inspectors, leaving industry a great deal of latitude with inspections. (Even after the blast, state utility regulators ordered PG&E  to inspect its own network of gas pipelines.)

And according to The Washington Independent, federal regulators are required to inspect only about 7 percent [6] of the country’s natural gas pipelines. That percentage is based on how populated the surrounding area is, and not the actual conditions of the pipelines.

Apparently, the needed improvements to the regulatory system are known.

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Administrative changes needed to improve federal preparedness and response

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Oil spill containment boom, shown holding back oil

Image via Wikipedia

In an article titled All Together Now, there is a discussion of the coordination needed at the federal level for disasters generally and for an oil spill in particular.  The article is subtitled: Collaboration-minded feds discover that getting agencies to work together is easier said than done.

Also on Sept. 15th, the Washington Post had a short news item regarding the management consulting study now underway at the new a bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEM), which formerly was the Minerals Management Service.  In case you forgot, that is the agency that mismanaged the BP Oil Spill.  The article notes that the McKinsey Co. study will not be completed until next year. A few more details are in this Wash Post note.

Let’s try not to have another spill until the results are know and implemented!

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Oil Spill Disaster — “lessons learned” discussed

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Critical Lessons from the Federal Response to the Gulf Oil Spill (HSPI Commentary) from the Geo. Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute, August 10, 2010.  While I agree with only some of the authors’ opinions, I think this piece is worth considering.  Readers are invited to comment, of course.

On the topic of what did BP learn,  Al.com ( an Alabama media site) posted Gulf oil spill a learning experience, say BP executives. While it is not entirely clear if BP thinks it has learned, or will learn, from the spill event, it is interesting to note that the firm is required to report out on the topic.

ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell and ConocoPhillips said last week that they would create a $1 billion system to handle blowouts and deepwater spills. And … BP had agreed to submit two documents on “lessons learned” after the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded — one covering spill containment and response and another on drilling safety.


Oil Spill Disaster – Day 100 – issues re science research

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The issue of the sharing of scientific findings is discussed in the July 27 in a Washington Post opinion piece titled Research on gulf oil spill shouldn’t take a backseat to litigation. Plus the article raises a new topic, that of the need for a comprehensive and strategic look at the research needed for such a major disaster event; I would argue both hard science and social science research should be included in such a comprehensive plan.

Our nation needs a comprehensive science plan to learn from and respond better to this tragedy. Those working in academia, federal and state government, nongovernmental organizations, and industry need to be consulted and included. The federal government must also make funding available, apart from the NRDA process, to enable independent, peer-reviewed science to be undertaken.

Also related to the topic is a recent statement by the American Assoc. of University Professors regard BP’s impact on academic freedom following the Gulf oil spill. See attached file titled  ACADEMIC FREEDOM.  One quote from that statement follows:

Perhaps this is the time to reexamine the increasing role corporations are playing in funding and controlling university research. Universities should work with faculty to set ethical standards for industry collaboration that champion the public interest and discourage faculty members from selling their freedom of speech and research to the highest bidder.

Thanks to Bill Cumming for bringing this statement to my attention. It is a timely addition to the topic discussed in today’s post.

CNN has posted an interesting summary of the effects, on the 100 day anniversary of the spill. See this article. And CNN also has posted some dramatic graphics of the spill since day 1.


Oil Spill Disaster – July 26- Hearings reveal a litany of problems

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Once again, we are getting the message that a series of Risky Decisions Led to Oil Spill. July 25, Wash. Post.

The calamity, the evidence now suggests, was not an accident in the sense of a single unlucky or freak event, but rather an engineered catastrophe — one that followed naturally from decisions of BP managers and other oil company workers on the now-sunken rig.

The Deepwater Horizon disaster can be attributed to “an organizational culture and incentives that encourage cost-cutting and cutting of corners — that reward workers for doing it faster and cheaper, but not better,” an academic advisory panel of scientists, chaired by Univ. of CA/Berkeley professor Robert Bea,…. “We know that in a very large number of cases, the seeds for failure are sown very early in the life of a particular system — during the concept development and design phases (e.g. the design of the Macondo well). These seeds are then allowed to flourish during the operation and maintenance phases, and, with the system in a weakened or severely challenged condition, it fails,” the panel’s report states.

And there may be lessons here for anyone involved in a complex and difficult venture. People tempted fate, hoping for the best while failing to insure against the worst. They did not take care of the little things. And then the big thing — the Macondo well — didn’t take care of itself.

Oil Spill Disaster – July 24 – evacuation order reveals underlying distrust

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No wonder no one trusts anyone. Here are two examples of problems: one with local public officials and the second with scientists in connection with BP.

Tension Among Officials Grows as Storm Nears, NYT, July 24. The complicated job of evacuating residents and workers in LA reveal great distrust of BP and federal officials.

At the end of the day, it’s my job and the parish president’s job to look out for what’s best for residents of St. Charles Parish,” said Scott Whelchel, the director of emergency preparedness for a parish that lies on the southwestern banks of Lake Pontchartrain. “The simple fact is, I wasn’t elected to take care of BP’s equipment.”

Once again a statement by BP about the oil spill plumes does not turn out to be correct.

Researchers link undersea oil plumes to BP spill. LA Times. July 24.

“… two studies confirm what in the early days of the spill was denied by BP and viewed skeptically by NOAA’s chief — that much of the crude that gushed from the Deepwater Horizon well stayed beneath the surface of the water.

Oil Spill – June 17- new people and systems for consequence mgmt.

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Yesterday, I noted the two new personnel changes (see below) that were announced by the President in his major address to the nation. Although both are experienced leaders/managers,  they do not have experience with oil spill disaster recovery.  I think that  Mr. Mabus will have to create procedures and systems for the consequences of the oil spill, since the oil spill event is being managed under the National Contingency Plan. In my opinion there is no specific guidance under the NCP  nor is there a precedent for dealing with the aftermath of such a large spill.  The pertinent section of the NCP is titled: Criteria for State, Local and Regional Oil Removal Contingency Plans Overview. I would like to hear from readers on this topic.

Obama chooses Navy secretary to lead Gulf recovery; CNN June 16.

Mabus was selected by President Obama on Tuesday to help draw up the government’s plan for recovery efforts in conjunction with officials in the Gulf Coast states.

President Obama taps Michael Bromwich as watchdog for offshore oil drilling, Wash Post 6/16

The man appointed Tuesday by President Obama to oversee offshore oil drilling has no experience with oil and gas issues, but he has a reputation for cleaning up embattled organizations.

Bromwich’s assignment… “is to build an organization that acts as the oil industry’s watchdog — not its partner.”