Audit in NYC Reveals Big Problems with Housing Repair Program Post-Sandy

Here is a second posting on the topic of post-disaster housing, this one focusing on the post-Sandy housing repair programs. Considering how much money is being spent on post-disaster housing programs, clearly the time has come for better oversight and some reform!

An article about the audit appeared in the NY Times, but here is the actual source document:

COMPTROLLER STRINGER AUDIT OF BUILD IT BACK REVEALS MILLIONS PAID OUT FOR INCOMPLETE WORK, DOUBLE-BILLING & UNDOCUMENTED TRAVEL COSTS. Frustrated homeowners forced to contend with over 100 procedural changes in the course of a year. Same subcontractors that bungled earlier work still on the job, working without legally enforceable controls.  Some excerpts:

New York City’s recovery effort following Superstorm Sandy was a boon for consultants who failed to do required work and left thousands of victims without help long after the storm ravaged the City—and problems continue to this day, according to an audit released by New York City Comptroller Scott M. Stringer.

The Comptroller’s audit revealed the City’s Office of Housing Recovery Operations (HRO) failed to properly monitor contractors and paid $6.8 million to them for work that that was flawed or incomplete – contributing to extensive delays in the delivery of aid to more than 20,000 people seeking help.

“New York City’s response to Sandy was a case study in dysfunction,” Stringer said. “During the course of this audit, I went to affected communities to hear first-hand the stories of the recovery from hundreds of City residents — from the endless delays, to the lost paperwork and the maddening lack of progress. With this audit, we present a new level of detail about how the City allowed consultants to run amok and what must be done to ensure these mistakes are never again repeated.”

The audit examined the Build it Back Single Family Program – which focused on owner-occupants of properties with one-to-four units affected by Sandy – from June 1, 2013 to August 1, 2014. The findings were enhanced by testimony from six public hearings that Stringer’s office held in areas hardest hit by the storm, which were attended by hundreds of New Yorkers. The audit included detailed reviews of a random sample of 70 applicants, plus reviews of program design, management and operations by HRO and its contractors.

This is not the first example of housing repair program problems. They occurred after H. Katrina in LA as well.  The Diva hopes to have more posts on the topic of the use of CDBG-DR funding for post-disaster home repair in the future.

The High Cost of Disaster Recovery

Is it any wonder that even the federal government is worried about future costs of disaster recovery? Here is an article about one element of housing repair costs post- Sandy, compensation for damage to public housing:

From the NY Daily News: FEMA to give $3 billion to NYCHA for Hurricane Sandy repairs in 33 developments. Some details:

  • A $3 billion bonanza from the Federal Emergency Management Agency — the disaster bureau’s largest grant ever — will go to repair and upgrade city public housing projects damaged by Hurricane Sandy.
  • The money will flow to 33 NYCHA developments in Brooklyn, Manhattan and Queens, Mayor de Blasio and Sen. Chuck Schumer plan to announce Tuesday.
  • “When Sandy hit, it brought weeks of cold and darkness for thousands of NYCHA residents – and too many are still feeling the impact,” de Blasio said. “This investment of $3 billion, the largest in FEMA history, won’t simply bring NYCHA developments back to pre-Sandy conditions. It will allow us to fortify buildings and utilities so that they’re resilient.”

Are Shipping Containers a Useful Source of Post-Disaster Housing?

After reading an article about the proposed use of shipping containers for affordable housing in Washington, DC, I asked one of my readers who is an architect for his view about the feasibility of using them for post-disaster housing. The original article, with some mention of the use of container housing in NY, is here.

In reply to my question, architect Don Watson offered the following:

“Cargo architecture” has made afoot hold. Using the units does not necessarily reduce costs. The Wash. Post article describes such accurately. New York City Emergency Planners have used the approach for disaster temporary housing….”temporary housing” is a misnomer….the units cost as much as convene final construction. But an advantage is that they can conceivably be built more rapidly as factory modules. It is the factory module technology that makes them quick to assemble on site. Thus part of solution. A few samples:

New modular disaster relief housing prototype developed...[Jul 07, 2014 • As of January this year 1,300 families were still living in temporary housing … shipping containers versus modular housing.]
Designing for Disaster: Which is better, modular or ship [May 21, 2013 • Another look at the question of what is the best way to build good housing].

Progress re H. Sandy Outcomes

There were two news items this week regarding improvements in efficiency of the Build Back program in NY and at FEMA with regard to payouts to victims: See

(1) Progress on Rebuiding in NY.  According to this Staten Island news article, progress is now being make on payments to Sandy victims whose homes were damaged — Hurricane Sandy victims see some relief (commentary).

(2) GAO Report on FEMA:  See Hurricane Sandy: FEMA Has Improved Disaster Aid Verification but Could Act to Further Limit Improper Assistance. GAO-15-15: Dec 12, 2014.

 

Revised Housing Recovery Plan for NJ

If at first you do not succeed, file a formal complaint and try again!

New Jersey Reaches Deal on Hurricane Sandy Aid. From the NYTimes on May 30th:

New Jersey has agreed to spend more federal disaster money to provide housing to people displaced by Hurricane Sandy and to make sure that the hardest-hit parts of the state get a proportional share of the money, according to a settlement reached on Friday.

The state also agreed to reconsider all of the applications for reconstruction aid that were rejected, after a review found that more than three-fourths of them should have been approved. The agreement stemmed from complaints by civil rights groups filed last year with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development.

“We have one more chance to get this right, and I am hopeful that this agreement will help the state do a better job,” said Frank Argote-Freyre, president of the Latino Action Network, one of the groups that filed the original complaint.

Build It Back – just not happening in NY post-Sandy

As was noted in the Lament posting last week, the housing recovery in NY and NJ is going far slower than anyone likes. From the Huff Post, this article titled Doubt Lingers for New Yorkers Devastated by Hurricane Sandy. The article is a bit windy to start with, but here are a few essential quotes:

In 2013 New York City received a total of $3.22 billion in federal grants for Sandy disaster relief and rebuilding. About $650 million of that money was designated for a program called NYC Build it Back, which former Mayor Mike Bloomberg announced in June 2013. The program is intended to help all residents who owned property at the time of the storm. Build it Back prioritizes low- and middle-income New Yorkers — meaning individuals who earn less than $48,100, or a four-person household that pulls in $68,700 annually.

But Build it Back has been a phantom presence, so far, in all damaged Sandy areas. It is drawing the ire of residents and of politicians alike, including New York City Comptroller Scott Stringer, who announced in April that his office is launching an official audit of the city program.

Lament re Disaster Recovery Housing Programs

The Diva wants to share this personal assessment she received recently re the severe problems encountered with federal housing programs after a disaster. It is written by a trusted person with practical knowledge of the recovery process, including recent experience after Hurricane Sandy. For obvious reasons, the author does not want to be identified.

I appreciate the author’s candor and value these observations because they help to explain the problems behind the scenes. In the past year I have posted dozens of articles about the problems and slow progress with housing recovery post-Sandy. Now I have a better understanding of the reasons. Some key points from the email:

Having lived for 15+ years with the fragmented, uncoordinated array of programs that are the federal de-facto policy for major disaster home repair, I think to may be time to begin thinking of a better way.

Owners of disaster damaged homes now get their repair assistance from a variety of sources such as:

  • 1. FEMA-funded Shelter and Temporary Essential Power (STEP) pilot program direct essential repair services
  • 2. National Flood Insurance Program settlements for
    a. Repair/reconstruction and
    b. Increased cost of compliance with flood-safe zoning
  • 3. FEMA Individual and Households Program (IHP) repair or replacement grants (up to about $31,000)
  • 4. State supplements to IHP – sometimes statutory (CA) usually ad hoc, per disaster.
  • 5. Small Business Administration Disaster Household Repair loans including
    a. Up to $200,000 for repair or reconstruction
    b. Up to $20,000 additional for mitigation
    c. Up to $200,000 additional to recast previous debt.
  • 6. FEMA-Sate Hazard Mitigation Grant program when targeted to home repair or acquisition
  • 7. HUD Community Development Block Grants – DR – usually a result of Congressional supplementary funding, through programs devised by state or local grantee governments.
  • 8. FEMA Funded Disaster Case management services to help household navigate and manage these and non-governmental solutions.

I dream of ONE all-encompassing federal disaster home repair program to take the place of the disconnected array of processes we now force people to struggle and suffer through.

I wonder if a single system might not deliver more complete, timely, customer-friendly and dramatically less costly home recovery after disaster.

The most politically and popularly appealing thought might be the elimination of the national flood insurance program to be replaced with a much more elegant system of risk management/financing and repair assistance.

One single, integrated program could incentivize mitigation, speed repair, increase loaning where appropriate (thereby decreasing grants), and consolidate multiple, unwieldy, constituency-maddening, uncoordinated, multi-governmental administration into a single application and fulfillment process with a named applicant assistant responsible for every complex application.

How crazy is this? Crazier than the great governments of NY, NJ, and NYC, all having had $100s of millions for home repair approved for over a year, but still unable to deliver virtually $ to applicants waiting since last Fall? Almost 20,000 applicants are waiting in NYC.

We saw this in Louisiana and assumed it was a capacity problem. In Texas, politics was assumed to be the cause of failure. But all three of these Sandy high-capacity governments can’t be the problem. It’s got to be the system of asking state/local governments to devise (for their first time) a disaster home repair program off a blank sheet of paper beginning months after the disaster happens. It’s too difficult.

Finally, the author asked me what I thought and if I knew of anyone else who is thinking this way?

I am not qualified to offer comments or suggestions, and I do not know of anyone engaged in research in this area. I invite comments and welcome information from anyone who has tackled this topic.

______________________________________________

UPDATE: Please see the comment by James Fossett that follows this posting. The link to his article is well worth highlighting. See his article titled Let’s Stop Improvising Disaster Recovery.

 

 

Haiti – still waiting for recovery

Rebuilding in Haiti Lags After Billions in Post-Quake Aid;” NY Times, Dec. 23.

When you look at things, you say, ‘Hell, almost three years later, where is the reconstruction?’ ” said Michèle Pierre-Louis, a former prime minister of Haiti. “If you ask what went right and what went wrong, the answer is, most everything went wrong. There needs to be some accountability for all that money.”

An analysis of all that money — at least $7.5 billion disbursed so far — helps explain why such a seeming bounty is not more palpable here in the eviscerated capital city, where the world’s chief accomplishment is to have finally cleared away most of the  rubble.

More than half of the money has gone to relief aid, which saves lives and alleviates misery but carries high costs and leaves no permanent footprint — tents shred; emergency food and water gets consumed; short-term jobs expire; transitional shelters, clinics and schools are not built to last.

Of the rest, only a portion went to earthquake reconstruction strictly defined. Instead, much of the so-called recovery aid was devoted to costly current programs, like highway building and H.I.V. prevention, and to new projects far outside the disaster zone, like an industrial park in the north and a teaching hospital in the central plateau.

Meanwhile, just a sliver of the total disbursement — $215 million — has been allocated to the most obvious and pressing need: safe, permanent housing. By comparison, an estimated minimum of $1.2 billion has been eaten up by short-term solutions — the tent camps, temporary shelters and cash grants that pay a year’s rent. “Housing is difficult and messy, and donors have shied away from it….”