From MIT’s Center for Transportation and Logistics a new report that outlines new ideas to address the nation’s disaster housing challenges: Disaster Housing Construction Challenges in America: Exploring the Role of Factory-Built Housing.  Press Release and direct URL to full report, which is 44 pages.

The report includes 11 recommendations for emergency managers; housing agencies; policymakers at state, local, tribal, territorial, and federal levels; leaders in the building code community; home construction companies; and others who have a goal of addressing challenges around disaster housing.  While factory-built housing is not a panacea, it should be a key component of the nation’s housing stock at a time when both the severity and frequency of natural disasters are increasing, and states continue to struggle to meet the demand for affordable housing.

Disaster housing is a challenge without easy answers or straightforward solutions.  Researchers at MIT’s Center for Transportation and Logistics have compiled their take on ways to improve our nation’s ability to take on disaster housing challenges.  More advanced construction methods can help ease some of the burden but will require action from policymakers, code officials and the construction industry.

Thanks to Dana Bres, U.S. Dept. of HUD, for this citation.

From the Orlando Sentinel: FEMA Ignores Housing Option for Displaced Families. At issue is HUD’s Disaster Housing Assistance Program. Here are some details:

DHAP could provide temporary rental assistance and wrap-around case management to low-income families in need, helping them find permanent housing solutions, secure employment, and connect to public benefits as they rebuild their lives. The program was developed after hard-won lessons from Hurricane Katrina, and has been used successfully after Hurricanes Rita, Gustav and Ike and Superstorm Sandy. After previous storms, steps were taken to stand up DHAP as quickly as two weeks after a disaster. Both the Bush and Obama administrations recognized DHAP as a best practice after disasters.

The Trump administration, unfortunately, is instead either relying on failed responses from previous storms that led to the need to create DHAP in the first place or trying new ineffective pilot programs. Administrator Brock Long testified last week before Congress that he favored shifting responsibilities for disaster housing recovery from the federal government onto the states and Puerto Rico. But the state-run disaster housing programs put in place as an alternative to DHAP have been plagued by significant delays. Fewer than 320 households in Florida and 150 households in Texas are in the pipeline to receive state housing assistance. FEMA’s experiment has fallen woefully short.

A dubious distinction for the NY City Public Housing Authority: not following up on lessons indicated, but not learned after H. Sandy. See: Post-Hurricane Sandy Chaos Could Happen Again at City Public Housing: Audit.

The Diva wonders if HUD bears some responsibility for not following up on its investments in public housing.  Be glad to hear from someone at HUD on this matter.

Here is a second posting on the topic of post-disaster housing, this one focusing on the post-Sandy housing repair programs. Considering how much money is being spent on post-disaster housing programs, clearly the time has come for better oversight and some reform!

An article about the audit appeared in the NY Times, but here is the actual source document:

COMPTROLLER STRINGER AUDIT OF BUILD IT BACK REVEALS MILLIONS PAID OUT FOR INCOMPLETE WORK, DOUBLE-BILLING & UNDOCUMENTED TRAVEL COSTS. Frustrated homeowners forced to contend with over 100 procedural changes in the course of a year. Same subcontractors that bungled earlier work still on the job, working without legally enforceable controls.  Some excerpts:

New York City’s recovery effort following Superstorm Sandy was a boon for consultants who failed to do required work and left thousands of victims without help long after the storm ravaged the City—and problems continue to this day, according to an audit released by New York City Comptroller Scott M. Stringer.

The Comptroller’s audit revealed the City’s Office of Housing Recovery Operations (HRO) failed to properly monitor contractors and paid $6.8 million to them for work that that was flawed or incomplete – contributing to extensive delays in the delivery of aid to more than 20,000 people seeking help.

“New York City’s response to Sandy was a case study in dysfunction,” Stringer said. “During the course of this audit, I went to affected communities to hear first-hand the stories of the recovery from hundreds of City residents — from the endless delays, to the lost paperwork and the maddening lack of progress. With this audit, we present a new level of detail about how the City allowed consultants to run amok and what must be done to ensure these mistakes are never again repeated.”

The audit examined the Build it Back Single Family Program – which focused on owner-occupants of properties with one-to-four units affected by Sandy – from June 1, 2013 to August 1, 2014. The findings were enhanced by testimony from six public hearings that Stringer’s office held in areas hardest hit by the storm, which were attended by hundreds of New Yorkers. The audit included detailed reviews of a random sample of 70 applicants, plus reviews of program design, management and operations by HRO and its contractors.

This is not the first example of housing repair program problems. They occurred after H. Katrina in LA as well.  The Diva hopes to have more posts on the topic of the use of CDBG-DR funding for post-disaster home repair in the future.